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Abstract This paper evaluates how the effect of introducing a carbon emission tax
and/or feed-in tariffs on capacity expansion decisions of generating companies varies
depending on the number and size of competing firms and technical conditions of the
network. To do so, it uses a Nash–Cournot model of the electricity market. This model
is then applied to the IEEE 6-bus network.We study three cases: onewith only a carbon
tax consistent with current carbon prices; one with only a feed-in tariff consistent with
current US levels, and one with simultaneous carbon taxation and feed-in tariff. We
show that, at least in our case, the quantity of renewable capacity expansion and the
electricity prices depend more significantly on the technical conditions of the network
and the number of competitors in the market than it depends on the presence of
economic penalties or incentives. We also show how interactions between imperfectly
competitive markets and physical networks can produce counterintuitive results, such
as an increase in consumer prices as a result of a reduction in network congestion. Our
results imply that no two countries would experience the same effects from a policy
on carbon tax and feed-in tariff if their electricity market does not have similarities in
technical and competitive conditions.
Keywords Electricity market · Competition · Capacity expansion · Carbon taxation ·
Feed-in tariff
B Temitayo Oderinwale
t.oderinwale15@ic.ac.uk
1 Institute for Energy Systems, School of Engineering, University of Edinburgh, Faraday Building,
The King’s Buildings, Mayfield Road, Edinburgh EH9 3JL, UK
2 Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Imperial College London South Kensington
Campus, London SW7 2AZ, UK
123
T. Oderinwale and A. H. van der Weijde
1 Introduction
Over the last decades, the structure of many electricity markets has evolved from a
regulated monopoly to a deregulated, competitive market. Usually, market deregu-
lation leads to an increase in competition. However, in many markets, the number
of firms involved in electricity generation remains small despite electricity market
deregulation. For this reason, competition among electricity generating firms is usu-
ally oligopolistic in nature. Moreover, because electricity is a homogeneous product
which is not distinguishable according to the fuel source used for its generation; with-
out some secondary tradingmechanism, there is the tendency for generating companies
(gencos) to use the cheapest fuel to maximize profits. This choice often has negative
environmental effects (such as carbon emissions) which are often not properly priced
or considered by the gencos. For instance, in 2012, electricity generation accounted
for 12.4 Gigatonnes of CO2 globally [6], making it the largest single contributor to
CO2 emissions.
Efforts are being made by different countries to realise a low carbon electricity
sector; central to many of these efforts are policies on carbon taxation and/or the
introduction of renewable subsidies. As a result, investment decisions by electric-
ity generating firms have changed to incorporate environmental performance [2].
However, in an oligopolistic setting, renewable policies may change the nature of
competition and the ability of firms to exert market power.
Various studies have assessed the effect of carbonpolicies, particularly theEuropean
Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) on the electricity market. Some of the
markets studied are those in Finland [8], Spain [10], United Kingdom [7], Nordic
area [16], the Netherlands–French–German–Belgium markets in [1] and the entire
EU region in [11]. These studies all agree that when EU-ETS was first introduced, it
caused an increase in both the generators’ profits and electricity prices, showing that
there are likely to be some market power effects.
Most market models that have been used to analyse the effects of carbon policies
such as [5] do not have an adequate representation of the oligopolistic nature of the
electricity sector. While these complications were considered in [14,15], the models
presented could not handle the technicalities of the sector. Aside this, these models do
not consider renewable subsidies, an alternative to carbon taxation.
Othermodels [3,21] do incorporate both carbon trading andGreenCertificates, sim-
ilar to the current paper. However, again, the inability of these models to adequately
characterize imperfect competition in electricity sector is their biggest drawback. [9]
recognizes both the oligopolistic structure of the electricity sector and its technical
characteristics and incorporates these into a model, but does not examine how gen-
eration capacity expansion would depend on the number of generating companies
involved in electricity market, which is an important variable.
In this paper we therefore bring together the above approaches to investigate how
the effect of introduction of carbon emission tax and feed-in tariffs on capacity expan-
sion decisions of generating companies varies depending on the number and size of
competing firms and technical conditions of the network. To do this, a Nash–Cournot
based mathematical model of an electricity market is constructed, taking into consid-
eration the technical characteristics of electricity networks. The Nash–Cournot model
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of an electricity market has been used extensively in analysing the power market and
the impacts of technical characteristics of the transmission network [22] and allows
for simultaneous consideration of the technical characteristics of the network, which
other,more complexmarket representation (such asSupplyFunctionEquilibria)would
make difficult.
Since the size of electricity markets differ from one country to another and the
number of participating companies differ, the behaviour of the market participants
would also differ. This work addresses these issues; the model used to address them
and its comprehensive mathematical explanation is presented in subsequent sections.
The remaining sections are outlined as follows: Sect. 2 discusses in detail how our
Nash–Cournot model was constructed. The network structure, input data and cases
considered are presented in Sect. 3. Results obtained when our model was applied to
the electricity network of Sect. 3 is analysed in Sect. 4. The conclusions and policy
implications are discussed in Sect. 5.
2 Methodology
The model built for this research is an extension of the model used in [4]. Minimum
generation levels, carbon emission taxes and renewable subsidies have been added to
Hobbs’ model. As the original model does, we will assume a static model in which
generating firms simultaneously decide on capacity expansion and generation levels,
in an open-loop fashion, while transmission is operated using a congestion pricing
scheme, such that the Nash–Cournot market equilibrium can be found by solving a
mixed complementarity problem (MCP).
2.1 Model parameters and variables
Throughout, indices are used to denote key elements: k,m indicates the bus/node, z
indicates the generating facility, l is used to refer to the transmission lines while a
indicates the genco. Model Parameters are uniquely represented, for instance, ICakz
refers to the cost to build generator z located at bus k and belonging to genco a; the
various model parameters and variables are listed in Table 1 below.
2.2 Model characteristics
To preserve linearity, at each bus in the network a linear demand function is assumed:
Pk (Qk) = Pok −
(
Pok
Qok
)
Qk. (2.1)
Generators compete to satisfy this demand, simultaneously choosing generation levels
and expansion to maximize their profits, subject to constraints.
Carbon emission tax and renewable subsidy (Feed-in Tariffs) are incorporated into
this model. These are two of the major approaches used by various countries in the
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Table 1 List of parameters and variables
Parameters
Pok Price intercept
Qok Quantity Intercept
Cakz Marginal generating cost
PCakz Price of carbon in $/tonne
Eakz Carbon emission in tonne/MWh
ICakz Investment cost to build a new generator
RIakz Feed-in tariff
Gmaxakz Maximum generating capacity
Gminakz Minimum generating capacity
Fminl Maximum power flow from the lines
Fmaxl Maximum power flow to the lines
PTDFl Power transmission distribution factor
Variables
xpakz Capacity expansion by each generating unit
pwakz Power generated by generator
qak Sales by each genco at each bus
qk Total quantity demanded at each bus
wk Transmission fee charged by the transmission company
yk The transmission service required by the generator to take energy to desired bus (k)
from the hub bus
quest to achieve low carbon electricity. Eakz is the amount of carbon (tonne/MWh)
emitted, it varies for each of the different generating sources. PCakz is the price per
tonne of Carbon. In the model, the total tax payable by generator z located at bus k and
belonging to genco a is CTaxakz = PCakz × Eakz. In addition, the feed-in tariff(RIakz)
is earned per MWh of power generated from renewable energy source such as wind
and solar. Gencos seek to expand their production capacities in an attempt to increase
their profit. ICakz represents the cost per MW of building new generating facilities.
Due to the existence of market equilibrium and the absence of market arbitrageurs,1
the total amount of power supplied to each bus is equal to the quantity of power
consumed. In this model, the gencos compete in quantities; hence, they decide the
quantity of power to sell at each bus and thereafter pay to use the transmission facilities
of the transmission company (Transco). The wheeling fee wk is the amount charged
for transmitting power from an arbitrary hub bus to a bus of interest. The transco seeks
to maximize its revenue
∑
k wkyk, while maintaining the limitations placed by the
technical capacities of the line.
In the model, Fminland Fmaxl are the parameters used to represent the technical
capacity of the transmission lines. As in [4], we use a linear DC approximation of
1 Arbitrageurs take advantage of price difference in the market; they buy a product in a place at lower price
and sell it in another place where it is worth more.
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the AC power flows in the network [18], through the use of Power Transmission
Distribution Factor PTDFs. The PTDF represents the change in power flows on the
different lines in the network when one unit of power is injected at each bus in the
network.
2.3 Mathematical representation of the market problems for each participant
We assume that each market participant maximizes its own profit, which is the dif-
ference between its revenue and costs. Increasing profit can be achieved by changing
the quantity of items sold, for which capacity may need to be expanded. The market
problem for each participant differs; the gencos’ and transcos’ problems are outlined
below.
2.3.1 Genco market problem
Gencos get their revenue from the sale of electricity, and from the renewable feed-in
tariff. Substituting in the demand function, this gives:
Revenue =
∑
k
({
Pok −
(
Pok
Qok
)∑
a
qak
}
qak +
∑
z
RIakzpwakz
)
(2.2)
The total cost incurred by the Genco is the sum of generation costs, transmission fees,
carbon taxes and investment costs.2
Cost =
{∑
k,z Cakzpwakz + (
∑
m wmqam −
∑
k,z Wkpwakz)+∑
k,z PCakzEakzpwakz +
∑
k,z xpakzICakz
}
(2.3)
The operation of the Gencos is subjected to the following constraints:
1. The power output from each generator cannot be greater than the sum of its max-
imum capacity, taking into account its capacity expansion.
2. Each generator has a minimum level at which it must operate. The power output
cannot be less than this amount.
3. The total sum of the power generated in the network is equal to the total sum of
the power demanded at the buses.
4. Regardless of prices, the quantity of electricity demanded at any bus cannot be
negative.
2 For mathematical programming convenience and directionality, the Genco is assumed to pay a positive
transmission fee when sending power to any bus from the hub bus and a negative fee when transmitting
power from any bus to the hub bus.
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Hence, the optimization problem of the Genco can be written as:
MAX
[∑
m
{(
Pok −
(
Pok
Qok
)∑
k
qak
)
− wm
}
(qam)
+
∑
k,z
{(RIakz + wk) − (Cakz + PCakz ∗ Eakz)} −
∑
k,z
xpakz ICakz
]
(2.4)
subject to:
∑
k
qak =
∑
k,z
pwakz : τa
pwakz ≤ Gmaxakz + xpakz : βakz
pwakz ≥ Gminakz : γakz
For all qak ≥ 0, xpakz ≥ 0; where τa, βakz, γakz, are the dual variables associated with
the constraints.
The first-order conditions of this problem are presented in Appendix A.
2.3.2 Transco market problem
The transco seeks to maximize its revenue from providing transmission facilities. It
acts as a price taker, assuming that it cannot influence the price paid for transmis-
sion facilities; hence it maximizes the value of transmission service offered to the
generators.
The optimization problem for the transmission company is written as:
MAX
∑
k Wk yk (2.5)
where
−
∑
k
PTDFklyk ≤ Fminl : ζl−∑
k
PTDFklyk ≤ Fmaxl : ζl+
(ζl+) and (ζl−) are the dual variables associated with the constraints.
The transco’s first order conditions are presented in Appendix B.
2.4 Market clearing
Both electricity and transmission markets must clear at all times. Electricity market
clearing is implicit in the above; to ensure that all transmission capacity provided is
used, we need an additionalmarket clearing condition, specifying that the transmission
capacity from each node to the hub is equal to its nodal balance:
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Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3
Bus 4
Bus 5Bus 6
Generator 2
Generator 3
Generator 1 
Generator 4 
Generator 6 
Load 1  
Load 6  
Load 2  Load  3 
Load 4  
Load 5  
Fig. 1 The IEEE 6-bus network as presented in [17]
∑
a
qak −
∑
a,z
pwakz = yk
The generating companies (Gencos) and transmission company (Transco) are the
market participants.
3 Network structure and input data
We apply the model to the IEEE 6 bus network shown in Fig. 1, where we assume that
all transmission lines have the same impedance except the line connecting bus 5 to bus
1 which has impedance two times that of the other lines. Generation occurs at all the
buses except bus 5. Bus 5 is also the only bus which has a different demand function
from the others. The demand function for bus 1,2,3,4 and 6 is P(Q) = 150− 0.096Q
and for bus 5 is P(Q) = 125 − 0.065Q (Q is the quantity of demand). This results
in a congestion profile that is representative of real-world networks. The input data to
the model is given below. The model built is applied to this network structure.
3.1 Costs and feed-in tariff
Generation and investment costs are listed in Table 2 below. Tax and feed-in levels are
consistent with current levels in the United States.
3.2 Cases considered
Three cases are considered: when only feed-in tariff is available, when only tax on
carbon emission is available and when both carbon tax and feed-in tariffs are available.
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Table 2 Costs and feed-in tariff for the different technologies
Coal (IGCC) Gas (Advanced
combined cycle)
Wind (offshore) Solar PV Nuclear
(advanced)
Generating cost
(USD/MWh)a [20]
38.6 47.5 22.8 11.4 23.6
Investment cost
(USD/MWh)b
125 125 80 80 71.4
Carbon price
(USD/tonne) [13]
12.18 12.18 0 0 0
Emission per technol-
ogy (tonne/MWh) [19]
0.85 0.48 0 0 0
Feed-in tariff
(USD/MWh) [20]
0 0 23 11 0
a This value is obtained by adding the fixed and the variable generating costs, assuming a typical generating
profile
b These values are assumed for the various technologies
CASE I 
Feed-in Tariff only
CASE II
Carbon Tax only
CASE III
Feed-in Tariff and 
Carbon Tax
5 Genco Compeon
o Unconstrained Transmission
o Constrained Transmission
2 Genco Compeon
o Unconstrained Transmission
o Constrained Transmission
Fig. 2 Schematic representation of the cases considered
To understand the dependence of the Gencos capacity expansion decisions on the
number of participating companies and technical conditions of the lines, each of the
cases is investigated under four conditions: 5 Genco competition—Constrained and
Unconstrained Transmission, and 2 Genco competition—Constrained and Uncon-
strained Transmission. In total, twelve subcases were investigated. A schematic
representation of the cases considered is shown above (Fig. 2).
The demand function at each bus as well as the total initial generation capacity in
the system and at each bus is the same for both the 5 Genco and 2 Genco competition.
Table 3 and Table 4 below show the initial capacity of each generating company, the
generator types and the locations for both competition scenarios. If transmission is
unconstrained, the lines have infinite capacity, while for the constrained transmission
case, line 61 has a maximum capacity of 50 MW, while the others remain uncon-
strained.
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Table 3 Generating capacity of each company for 5 Genco competition
Bus Generator Capacity (MW)
Company A Bus 1 Coal 750
Company B Bus 2 Gas 750
Company C Bus 3 Coal 300
Bus 3 Nuclear 300
Company D Bus 4 Gas 250
Bus 4 Nuclear 250
Company E Bus 6 Nuclear 500
Total 3100
Table 4 Generating capacity of each company for 2 Genco competition
Bus Generator Capacity (MW)
Company S Bus 1 Coal 750
Bus 4 Gas 250
Bus 6 Nuclear 500
Company T Bus 2 Gas 750
Bus 3 Coal 300
Bus 3 Nuclear 300
Bus 4 Nuclear 250
Total 3100
4 Results and discussion
The results obtained in each of the subcases considered are presented below.
Values for the price of electricity at each bus, the transmission price charged for
electricity, the quantity of capacity expansion by each company and the profit of each
company are presented in Tables 5, 6 and 7 respectively. All Gencos involved in
capacity expansion used renewable technologies.
Feed-in tariffs (Case I) or a combined policy (Case III) do not change electricity
prices; in the first case, because feed-in tariffs do not change the marginal cost of
electricity production, and in the second case, because changes in marginal costs are
offset by changes in oligopolistic mark-ups. The effects of constraining transmission
and the transmission company’s revenue are also the same for these two cases. As
expected, prices are lower under the 5 Genco competition, because a higher level of
competition reduces oligopolistic mark-ups.
Under some network conditions, a non-zero transmission fee is charged to produc-
ers. As seen in Table 5, congestion affects the various buses differently. Naturally, bus
6 is most affected by a tight constraint on the line supplying most of its power, but
effects propagate throughout the network.
Clearly, electricity prices depend only on the demand function at the buses except
when congestion of the network occurred. Interestingly, the difference in prices
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Table 6 Capacity expansion by each company under feed-in tariffs only
5 Genco competition (GW) 2 Genco competition (GW)
A B C D E S T
CASE I feed-in
tariff only
Constrained
transmission
0 0 0.111 0.211 0.211 0.153 0.053
Unconstrained
transmission
0 0 0.111 0.211 0.211 0 0
CASE II carbon
tax only
Constrained
transmission
0 0 0.006 0.106 0.106 0.088 0
Unconstrained
transmission
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CASE III feed-in
tariff and carbon
tax
Constrained
transmission
0 0 0.111 0.211 0.211 0.153 0.053
Unconstrained
transmission
0 0 0.111 0.211 0.211 0 0
between the two network conditions is not uniform for all the buses, and does not
always vary in an intuitive direction. For instance, for Case II (Carbon Tax Only),
under the 5 Genco competition, while bus 1 would have a reduction in price of $6.47
per MWh, the consumer at bus 6 would experience an increase in price of $1.23 per
MWh between the constrained and unconstrained network conditions. This suggests
that the consumers would have significantly different experiences depending on their
location in the network.
Despite a higher total amount of generation in Cases I and III, the network is
not congested under the 5 Genco competition, compared to the 2 Genco competition
where network congestion occurred under the constrained network conditions; this
shows that higher levels of market power can create congestion.
Case II is different from the other cases. Transmission congestion occurs under the
constrained network conditions for both competition scenarios, however, as before, the
congestion is higher for the 2 Genco competition. As seen in Table 6 above, capacity
expansion only occurred under constrained transmission and was lower than those
of Cases I and III. This suggests that the enforcement of carbon taxation only does
not necessarily lead to investment in renewable energy or low carbon sources. The
technical constraints of the network play a significant role in this case.
The company with the highest existing capacity does not necessarily have the
highest profit. Under the 5 Genco competition, Companies A and B, which have
the highest joint capacity, rarely have the highest profit. Values from Table 7 show
that Company A—which has the highest generation output—is the most profitable
company only when carbon tax was not considered. Company’s profit depends more
on the type of generating technology used. For the 2 Genco competition, Company
S which often generated less, had the higher profit in the constrained network. This
shows that, especially when fewer companies are involved, the network layout and
constraints is of crucial importance in determining the company profitability.
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Fig. 3 Average price of electricity
4.1 Comparison of results obtained
As the above section has highlighted, there are important differences between some of
the cases considered; we will now look at these in more detail. Figures 3,4,5 compare
average electricity prices at the buses, the total investment and the total profit under
both constrained and unconstrained network conditions.
4.1.1 Comparison of average prices
An average of the unit price of electricity at the buses under the various cases and
competition scenarios is presented in Fig. 3 above. It can be seen that the prices are
generally lower under the 5Genco competition, as expected. Somewhat less intuitively,
average prices are also often lower in the constrained network. This is an effect of
the interaction between market and network conditions, which would never be seen
in a perfectly competitive cost minimization model. What happens here is that, as a
result of congestion, prices in the (import-constrained) bus 6 increase; some additional
investment at bus 6makes up part, but not all of this increase. However, in the rest of the
network, there is now more generation capacity available. This reduces oligopolistic
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Renewable
Incenves only Carbon Tax only
Renewable
Incenves and
Carbon Tax
5 Genco constrained 533.504 219.338 533.504
5 Genco unconstrained 533.504 0 533.504
2 Genco constrained 205.2 88.468 205.2
2 Genco unconstrained 0 0 0
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Fig. 4 Comparison of total investment under the different cases considered
mark-ups and therefore reduces prices. Since demand at bus 6, where prices increase,
is low relative to the combined demand at the other buses, average prices decrease
with congestion. In effect, partially cutting off part of the network makes the rest of
the network more competitive.
From Fig. 3 above, it is seen that electricity price was generally highest when only
carbon tax was active. This is because the introduction of carbon tax increased the cost
of production for some of the companies. These companies were then able to transfer
the cost of the carbon tax imposed on them to the consumer which leads to the increase
in price of electricity being noticed. However the average prices were the same and
had the highest value for the 2 Genco unconstrained for the three cases. This shows
the significant effect of both market power of the gencos and the network conditions
on the electricity price.
4.1.2 Comparison of capacity expansion
Figure 4 shows a chart of the values of the capacity expansion for the different cases and
competition considered. Both the technical conditions of the lines and the economic
incentives influence the quantity of capacity expansion.
The amount of expansion under the 2 Genco competition is significantly less than
under the 5 Genco competition in all cases; again, this is expected because the more
market power generators have, the more incentives they have to withhold capacity and
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Renewable
Incenves only Carbon Tax only
Renewable
Incenves and
Carbon Tax
5 Genco constrained 173.96 165.5 157.24
5 Genco unconstrained 173.96 176.16 157.24
2 Genco constrained 185.18 167.75 168.46
2 Genco unconstrained 193.5 176.78 176.78
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Fig. 5 Comparison of total profits under the different cases considered
raise prices. The quantity of expansion is also lowest for Case II (carbon tax only) and
only occurred under the constrained network conditions for both competitions. This
suggests that the decision to invest depends significantly on the technical condition
of the network and the number of competitors in the market and not entirely on the
presence of economic penalties, at least not if these are set at current levels.
Moreover, it is clear that the two policies do not have additive effects; if a feed-in
tariff is implemented, an additional carbon tax does not change capacity expansion
levels, although it changes profits (as we will see below). A feed-in tariff already
stimulates investment in renewables, such that an additional and relatively low carbon
tax only increases costs, rather than change investment patterns.
4.1.3 Comparison of profits
With regard to the total profits under the various competition scenarios, the profits
under the 2 Genco competition were higher than those under the 5 Genco competition
by between 1.36 and 12.43%. This happens both under the constrained and uncon-
strained network conditions. As mentioned above, the higher profit seen under the 2
Genco competition is a direct result of the large market power generators exercise
when fewer competitors are involved [12].
A comparison of the values in Fig. 5 above shows that under the 2 Genco com-
petition, the constrained network had lower profits than the unconstrained network;
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a result of the levying of transmission fees and a change in market power. However,
under 5 Genco competition, this does not occur, except when only a carbon tax is
levied, as this is the only case where transmission congestion occurs.
In the 5 Genco case, the transmission fee was only charged when only carbon
tax was active; however, this fee was lower than the fee charged for the 2 Genco
competition under same network conditions. Furthermore, this fee was charged under
all the constrained network conditions for the 2Genco competition, although the values
were not the same for all the cases considered. This indicates that the Transco benefits
more when the generators have more market power.
5 Conclusions and policy implications
Previous studies have been carried out on generation capacity expansion under carbon
taxes and feed-in tariffs or other renewable incentives [3,9,21]. However, these studies
ignore how capacity expansion would depend on the number of the competing firms
in an oligopolistic market and on the technical conditions of the network. This paper
has addressed these issues.
In this paper, various cases and scenarios are considered to understand how the
impact of introducing carbon taxes and feed-in tariffs on the capacity expansion deci-
sion of generating companies would depend on the number and size of the competing
firms and the technical conditions of the network. This study considers investment
when only carbon tax are levied, when only feed-in tariffs are adopted and when
both are used at the same time. In each of the cases, four competition scenarios were
simulated, namely: 5 Genco competition in an unconstrained network, 5 Genco com-
petition in a constrained network, 2 Genco competition in an unconstrained network
and 2 Genco competition in a constrained network. The price of electricity and the
profits of the companies were also analysed.
The electricity market is modelled as a mixed complementarity problem where the
companies compete in quantities (Nash–Cournot). This stylized model is then applied
to a six-bus network. The model built and used for this research has certain intrinsic
qualities: it incorporates the technical characteristics of the electricity network, and
represents the market conditions better than a simple cost minimization model. It is
still heavily simplified and stylized, but key insights can be drawn from it that we
expect to also hold true in larger models.
The most important conclusion is that the effect of a policy such as carbon tax or
feed-in tariff depends more on the technical conditions of the network and the num-
ber of competitors in the market than on anything else. As such, no two countries
can experience the same effects from such a policy if their electricity markets or net-
works are different. The quantity of capacity expansion also depends significantly on
the number of competitors in the market. For instance, under carbon taxation only,
capacity expansion only occurred under the constrained network conditions for both
competitions; however, the quantities were lower than those of other economic con-
ditions. It was also observed that when the competition intensity is higher consumers
benefit more from capacity expansion because it leads to a higher electricity supply
and lower electricity prices.
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Interestingly, there are also important interactions between the technical conditions
of the network and themarket organization. These are not always intuitive; for instance,
average electricity pricesmaydecreasewith network congestion. This again underlines
the importance of a thorough country-specific analysis to inform energy policy.
Providing incentives for renewables without carbon taxation does not take into
account the negative impacts of carbon on the environment although it encourages
production from low carbon sources. Incentivising renewables and carbon taxation
combines the advantages of both. It takes into account the negative effect of carbon
and encourages production from low carbon sources. However, in our model, adding a
carbon price to a market where a feed-in tariff is already present only serves to reduce
generator profits, rather than leading to additional investment or lower prices.
Naturally, our results are specific to the network setting we have analysed, and to
the (relatively low) current levels of renewable support and carbon prices. However,
we expect the general qualitative conclusions above to carry over to larger models.
Further research is needed to analyse the quantitative effects of feed-in tariffs and
carbon prices in specific oligopolistic markets. Further research should also address
how investment would be spread out over a longer period. This would be useful to
determine the long-term effects of the various policies designed to achieve low carbon
electricity sector.
To improve the current model, certain characteristics such as variable generation
output over various times of the day, variablemarginal cost, the presence of arbitrageurs
and energy storage mechanisms can be incorporated. This would enhance the model’s
ability to represent future power networks and improve the quality of result obtained;
however, it would also increase the computational complexity of the model.
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Appendix A: Generating companies problem
The Lagrange equation of the optimization problem of Generating Companies (Gen-
cos) is written as:
L(pw, q, xp, τ, β, γ ) =
{(
Pok −
(
Pok
Qok
)∑
k
qak
)
− wm
}
(qam) − x pakz ∗ ICakz
+ {(I Rakz + wk) − (Cakz + PCakz ∗ Eakz)} pwakz + τa(pwakz − qak)
+βakz(pwakz − x pakz − Gmaxakz) + γakz(Gminakz − pwakz) (A1)
The first order conditions for the optimization problem are:
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1 With respect to pwakz
δL
δ(pwakz)
= {(I Rakz + wk) − (Cakz + PCakz ∗ Eakz) + τa − βakz + γakz} ≤ 0
pwakz ≥ 0
pwakz{(I Rakz + wk) − (Cakz + PCakz ∗ Eakz) + τa − βakz + γakz} = 0
(A1.1)
2 With respect to qak
δL
δqak
=
⎧⎨
⎩
⎛
⎝Pok −
(
Pok
Qok
)
(2qak +
∑
a =b
qbk) − wm − τa
⎞
⎠
⎫⎬
⎭ ≤ 0
qak ≥ 0
qak
⎧⎨
⎩
⎛
⎝Pok −
(
Pok
Qok
)
(2qak +
∑
a =b
qbk) − wm − τa
⎞
⎠
⎫⎬
⎭ = 0 (A1.2)
3 With respect to xpakz
δL
δ(x pakz)
= {−ICakz + βakz} ≤ 0;
x pakz ≥ 0
x pakz{−ICakz + βakz} = 0 (A1.3)
4 With respect to βakz
pwakz − Gmaxakz − xpakz ≤ 0
βakz ≥ 0
βakz(pwakz − Gmaxakz − xpakz) = 0 (A1.4)
5 With respect to γakl
Gminakz − pwakz ≤ 0
γakz ≥ 0
γakz(Gminakz − pwakz) = 0 (A1.5)
6 With respect to τa
∑
k
qa,k −
∑
k,z
pwakz = 0 (A1.6)
Equations (A1.1) to (A1.6) form the KKT conditions which were implemented in
AIMMS to represent the Genco Market Problem.
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Appendix B: Transmission company’s problem
The first order (KKT) conditions for the optimization problem of Transmission Com-
pany’s is derived from the Lagrange multiplier and presented below.
1 With respect to ζl+
∂L
∂(ζl−)
= Fminl + PT DFkl ∗ yk ≤ 0
ζl− ≥ 0
ζl−(Fminl + PT DFkl ∗ yk) = 0 (B1.1)
2 With respect to ζl+
∂L
∂(ζl+)
= Fmaxl − PT DFkl ∗ yk ≤ 0
ζl+ ≥ 0
ζl+(Fmaxl − PT DFkl ∗ yk) = 0 (B1.2)
3 With respect to yk
∂L
∂(yk)
= wk + PT DFkl(ζl− − ζl+) = 0 (B1.3)
Equations (B1.1), (B1.2), (B1.3) are implemented in AIMMS to represent the trans-
mission company’s problem.
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